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Scopul acestei lucrări este acela de a găsi o serie de aspecte analitice a noţiunii de administraţie din punctul de 
vedere al teoriei politice şi ştiinţelor administrative. 
Vom studia pentru început propoziţia: 
p: X este autonom 
Sub ce aspecte această propoziţie are sens?  
Ar putea avea sens această discuţie în condiţiile în care am putea să realizăm următoarea afirmaţie: 
Definiţie: X este autonom dacă şi numai dacă A. 
Poate fi X autonom în mod izolat? Sau altfel spus poate fi X autonom fără a fi în relaţie cu un alt actor? Sau 
această propoziţie are sens numai dacă vom lua în considerare câteva aspecte particulare ale unei variabile C? 
C: X este autonom dacă şi numai dacă A în contextul C. 
Contextul se refera aici la aspecte externe care pot fi separate de X dar care într-un mod oarecare sunt relevante 
pentru înţelegerea naturii structurii lui X 
Contextul poate să fie descris în foarte multe modalităţi. Poate spre exemplu să se refere la un anumit set de alţi 
agenţi care au anumite caracteristici în raport cu un altul. 
Fără  îndoială  că  această  instituţie  poate  să  pretindă  că  este  autonomă  în  sens  restrâns  dar  este  complet 
independentă de alţi factori externi.  
Pentru toate persoanele administrative, chiar şi cele care bucură de o oarecare libertate se poate pune în discuţie 
dependenţa lor de alte aspecte ale vieţii sociale, politice, economice, juridice, etc. cu alte cuvinte dependenţa de 
un terţ element asupra căruia nu-şi poate exercita influenţa. O entitate autonomă are anumite condiţii de mediu 
care trebuie îndeplinite înainte de a fi clasificată chiar ca şi entitate. Şi nu toate entităţile sunt autonome sau libere 
în orice sens al acestor noţiuni. 
Cuvinte cheie: Autonomie, descentralizare, autonomie institutională 
 
Abstract  
The aim of this work is to find a number of analytical aspects of the concept of administration in terms of political 
theory and administrative science. 
We will first study the sentence:  
P: X is severable 
Under what aspects this sentence makes sense? 
This could make sense if we can make the following claim: 
Definition: X is severable if and only if A. 
Can X be severable in isolation? Or in other words can X be severable without being in relationship with another 
actor? Or this sentence makes sense only if we consider some particular aspects of a variable C? 
C: X is independent if and only if A in context C. 
The context here refers to external aspects that can be separated from X, but which can be relevant in order to 
understand the nature of the structure of X. 
The context can be described in many ways. For example it can refer to a particular set of other agents who have 















































































































































































































































































There  is  no  doubt  that  this  institution  can  claim  that  it  is  autonomous  in  a  narrow  sense  but  is  completely 
independent from other external factors.  
For all administrative persons, even those who enjoy a certain freedom, their dependence to other aspects of 
social, political, economic, legal life, etc... may be called into question, in other words, dependence on a third item 
on which he cannot exert influence. An autonomous entity has certain environmental conditions which have to be 
fulfilled before being classified as an entity.  And not all entities are autonomous and free in any sense of these 
notions 
 Keywords: Autonomy, descentralization, institutional autonomy 
JEL Classification: H77, H83 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of autonomy of public organizations grows in importance both in practice and contemporary 
public management. Especially when taking into account the organization of administrative entities an 
existing phenomenon can be observed in the OECD countries as well as in countries in a developing 
process: the need for institutional autonomy. 
In the comparative analysis made by Pollitt and Bouckaert on public management the growing trend of 
specialization of functions can be noticed and also a decentralization of authority from the center to the 
periphery related to the decrease of the size of the public sector by reducing the large bureaucratic 
organizations (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). 
This trend of specialization, decentralization and fragmentation began in Anglo-Saxon world in the 80s 
(New Zealand, United Kingdom). But this trend was later developed in countries such as Canada and 
the Netherlands and can be easily observed in Belgium. 
Some authors have called this phenomenon "agentification" of the public sector and they have identified 
it as being a part of the doctrine of New Public Management (NPA) procedure developed in recent 
years. Schick (2002) has labeled this trend as "the vehicle of New Public Management" while Talbot 
(2004) claimed that "the form of autonomous organization of public activities has become a subject of 
reform programs in many countries in recent years [and that] these initiatives may be grouped in various 
forms: from reforming existing entities (U.S., Sweden, Finland) until the creation of new ones, with 
limited autonomy (UK, Netherlands), in order to reach extreme high autonomy.” Talbott added that in 
some  cases  we  can  observe  the  creation  of  new  tasks  (UK,  Netherlands)  while  in  other  cases 
contracting the performance is added to existing tasks (U.S.). In any of these cases it is always sought 
to improve the quality of provided public services as well as the performance of public sector. The so-
called ideal type of entity subject to the New Public Management - structurally disaggregated from 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































decision-making with managerial and controlled freedom only through the organization prism - has been 
regarded as promising. 
2. METHODOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEWS  
For all administrative persons, even those who enjoy a certain freedom, their dependence to other 
aspects of social, political, economic, legal life, etc... may be  called into question, in other words, 
dependence on a third item on which he can not exert influence. An autonomous entity has certain 
environmental conditions which have to be fulfilled before being classified as an entity.  And not all 
entities are autonomous and free in any sense of these notions. 
We can illustrate this view by considering a one-dimensional continuum where an autonomous agent is 
located between social isolation and dependence due to a certain criterion. So, autonomy is a problem 
of the degree to which it can be observed and not a dichotomy (Suksi ,1998). 
Any satisfactory theory of autonomy must convincingly answer to questions such as:  
1.  What is autonomy? 
2.  What are the necessary and sufficient criteria which have to be met before a "moral person of 
public law" can claim to be autonomous? 
3.  Under what circumstances can we argued that an entity is autonomous? 
4.  What points of interest - where they are - must be pursued in order to pretend that a specific 
entity or a particular act is autonomous? 
5.  Must  the  administrative  autonomy  of  an  agent  X  be  in  a  certain  condition  accepted  or 
confirmed by other entities? 
6.  Can these entities give consent before the classification of the agent as being autonomous? 
What relevant criteria should be applied here? How important is self-comparison with other 
values? Can an entity claim to be autonomous? Does an agent have to know that he is 
autonomous  in  order  to  be  one?  Can  an  entity  be  autonomous  be  autonomous  by  pure 
chance, or is likely to be independent only if the administrative agent in question has the 
possibility to decide to be autonomous? 
7.  Is autonomy a good thing? And if it is, under what aspect? 















































































































































































































































































9.  Is autonomy, in some way or another, something achievable, realistic? 
10.  If the X and Y agents are both autonomous as we will know in a particular situation, which of 
the two agents is more autonomous? 
11.  Can a representative be autonomous from the one that he represents and yet to be politically 
responsible? 
We haven’t found any kind of theory of autonomy that can respond to these questions in a satisfactory 
manner. Here is why it appears as being urgent the achievement of a scientific study in order to find the 
scientific instruments that might prove the answer to these questions. 
3. COMPARATIVE ASPECTS  
The notion of “autonomous administrative authorities” or autonomous is used to set up administrative 
bodies  put  up  at  centre,  local  or  central  level  in  the  territory,  which  are  characterized  by  their 
independence from other entities and administrative hierarchies (Petrescu, 2000). 
The principle of decentralization led to the maximum, is being confused with autonomy, either because 
the administrative authorities in their desire to defend and achieve their special and local interest, not to 
touch or pass within the sphere of general interest (Văraru, 1925), the State names in charge one of its 
representatives, on the one hand to supervise the activities of decentralized authorities, in order to be 
profitable to the units,  and on the other side to overcome, in principle, any change that would be made 
to General laws and regulations (Văraru, 1925). 
It can be seen in recent years an increasing number of central administrative authorities in several 
European countries (Boev, 2003). 
Well, the doctrine of specialty has interpreted this phenomenon as evidence of a desire to modernize 
the traditional administration (Rivero and Waline, 1994), or a failure or maladjustment of the traditional 
administrative  structures,  but  in  equal  measure  that  of  the  jurisdiction  for  the  newest  matters  of 
administration (Laubadère, Venezia and Gaudement, 1999). 
Chauvin (1998) said that the administrative authorities are probably the most original creation of these 
years being probably related, as being said before, to the New Public Management trend.  
Administrative organization of a large state, like France, is complex. France is one of the states that 
upgrade its administrative structures, not limited to the reorganization of central and local. In this respect 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































power.  The  reform  introduces  four  fundamental  texts  concerning  the  local  referendum,  financial 
autonomy, freedoms and responsibilities of local governments. 
Hans Kelsen, who has long been the heart of French and European constitutional engineering and old 
member of the Constitution council, says that the administration represents all the activities under the 
control of government and maintains public interest and needs (Pascal, 2005). 
The history of the centralization of the administration is being confused with that of state building under 
the old regime in which the Sun King (Louis the XIVth) had perfected a system of power and personal 
enrichment, saying "The State is Me" (L’ etat c’ est moi), i.e. power is in the hands of a single person . 
Over  the  century  the  exercise  of  power,  progresses  and  reforms,  finally  reached  decentralization 
(Sharpe, 1993). 
In France, the notion of independent administrative authority first appears in the Act of 6 January 1978 
relating to information, files and freedoms, although since 1941 the Commission of Central Bank (van 
Lang, 1999) was created – an authority which can be included among those autonomous authorities.  
Subsequently, the doctrine began to be included in the category of central administrative authorities, 
different institutions, but which had similar features. 
There are authors who understand the autonomous administrative authority as being only institutions 
that  have  a  real  decision-making  power,  while  others  have  deemed  that  they  have  the  quality  of 
autonomous  administrative  authorities,  those  institutions  which  exercise  their  power  through  other 
sources than issuing decisions, by means of opinions, recommendations, suggestions, proposals, etc... 
(van Lang, 1999).  
It appears that the latter effect was adopted by the French legislature for a number of autonomous 
administrative authorities, namely the National Committee for the Evaluation of Universities (Law of 10 
July 1989), the National Control of interception referring to the Security (Law of 10 July 1991) and the 
Advisory Committee of National Defense secrecy (Law of 8 July 1998). 
We  can  therefore  analyze  from  this  perspective  characteristic  traits  of  autonomous  administrative 
authorities. Thus, in the French doctrine were highlighted among the main features of these authorities: 
1.  They are public institutes, to which the legislature gives them guarantees of independence in 
order to achieve the best possible the purpose for which they were established.  
2.  Some autonomous administrative authorities have uni-personal character, but most of them 















































































































































































































































































3.  They are administrative authorities and not judicial, although the legislature has entrusted 
some of them a certain power of penalty.  
4.  They are not only simple committee of experts convened to adjust certain problems.  
5.  The powers of administrative authorities are not limited in general, the granting of consultations 
and opinions, on the contrary, in most cases have the power of decision making.  
6.  The administrative authorities are not subject to any hierarchical control, or any tutelage in 
exercising them. Therefore, it is notable the legislature will and effort to provide the means by 
which  he  ensures  its  independence.  Thus,  are  presented  the  conditions  under  which  the 
members of this authority are elected, the term of office, the illegibility and incompatibility 
cases, etc. (Petrescu, 2000, Iovanas et all 1979). 
7.  The same authors notes that the guarantees of independence and the absence of hierarchical 
relationships does not mean isolation of autonomous administrative authorities, depending on  
the Prime Minister or a minister, as acting for the State and they do not have their own financial 
means (van Lang, 1999). In this case, at least for the presented institutions we can not talk 
about a part of the financial autonomy, a part of administrative autonomy. 
In this context of ideas concerning the independence of these authorities it is noted that they must fulfill 
their respective objectives with impartiality and objectivity (Chapus, 1999). 
The acts issued by the administrative authorities may be subject to appeal at the administrative judge or 
at the common law judge in the latter case only if the legislature decided in the interest of a good 
administration of justice. 
Therefore, the rule is the legality of acts of administrative authorities through disputed claims office, 
because it attacks the legal authority of the state (Laubadère, Venezia and Gaudement, 1999). 
However the French legislature, on the basis of timeliness and consistency, has upheld the power of the 
judicial judge for annulment of individual acts with the sanction given by some administrative authorities 
in the economic and financial domain.  
The quality of autonomous administrative authority is expressly provided in some legal acts governing 
the organization and their operation. 
National Commission of Informatics and Freedoms (created through the  Law of 6 January 1978 and 
Decree of 17 July 1978) aims at the supervision of the order relating to the establishment and use of 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































Explicitly, the law qualifies the Commission as an autonomous administrative authority and states that 
its  members  "do  not  receive  instructions  from  any  other  authority"  (Laubadère,  Venezia  and 
Gaudement, 1999). 
The Higher Audiovisual Council was organized by the Law of 17 January 1989 in place of the National 
Commission for Communication and Liberties. The Higher Audiovisual Council is qualified as being an 
"independent authority" having the aim of adjusting the public and private radio-television sector. 
The  Stock  Exchange  Committee  is  responsible  keep  in watch  the  correct  execution of  the  stock 
exchange, granted by the Law of 2 August 1989 and 2 July 1996.  
 Ombudsman established by 1973 Law is qualified as being an independent authority by the 13 January 
1989 Law. The Ombudsman exerts upon the administration, including local services, decentralized 
public institutes and authorized organizations to perform public service, an original control, which is 
different from the jurisdictional and traditional administrative controls (Rivero and Waline, 1994). 
Through this institution, it is given a protector more accessible than the judge to the one that it is 
administrated, which may be informed on the deficiencies of state administration. 
Even  if  through  the  legal  regulations,  such  other  public  institutes  are  not  explicitly  qualified  as 
autonomous administrative authorities, they will be placed in this category if they correspond to the 
specific characteristics. So, are considered autonomous administrative authorities the following: The 
Poll Commission to whom is given the task of ensuring the quality and objectivity of the opinion polls 
held in connection with the election consultation and the referendum; The Competition Council having 
the task of ensuring the observance of companies regarding the respecting of legislation on freedom of 
prices  and  competition;  The  Commission  Control  Security,  which,  among  other  duties  may  apply 
disciplinary sanctions, in order to make the insurers respect their legal obligations etc. (Chapus, 1999).    
Autonomous administrative authorities are held in other European countries. 
Thus, in Luxembourg the Economic and Social Council is being organized. 
In Ireland series of public institutions operate which can be considered as having a high degree of 
autonomy,  for  example,  Independent  Radio  and  Television  Commission  (Independent  Radio  and 
Television Commission, established in 1988), the Central Bank of Ireland, Combat Poverty Agency. 
In Spain, the defender of the People is set in the Constitution and regulated by an organic law. People’s 
defender  is  a  high  representative  of  “Cortes  Generales”  appointed  by  them  to  safeguard  the 















































































































































































































































































which have to be presented to the “Cortes Generales” (The Parliament). 
Also, the Court of Auditors is provided in the Constitution, the organic law governing the composition, 
organization and operation.  
In Italy, under the Constitution, the law ensures the independence of the State’s council, advisory 
organization on legal and administrative matters, of the Court of Auditors, and of their members in front 
of the government.  
In the United Kingdom, according to the doctrine, after the year 1970 the term Quango was imposed 
Quasi-autonomous  non-governmental  organization)  (Carsten,  Flinders  and  Van  Thiel,  1999;  
Wettenhall, 1981) designating three types of bodies which have a certain role in the administration 
process of the UK but they are not ministerial departments or structures thereof (Ziller, 1993). 
In a 1980 report, the term of “Non Departamental Public Bodies” was adopted, used by the board under 
the logo of N.D.P.B. (Ziller, 1993). 
Although vast and complex network of these Quang was criticized, after the year 1980 there have been 
established  some  autonomous  organizations,  a  kind  of  executive  agencies,  inside  ministerial 
departments.  
It is believed that these categories of British NDPB or Guang does not refer to the essential notion in the 
public right on the continent, that of a moral person, but it is notable , however, that are autonomous 
from ministerial services in taking decisions and that it is their very reason to exist. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: MEASURING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTONOMY 
The research conducted so far in the doctrine of specialty regarding the administrative autonomy varies 
from the descriptive aspects – demonstrating the levels of autonomy of different administrative persons 
(Smullen,  van  Thiel  and  Pollitt,  2001;  Verhoest,  2002;  Christensen,  1991,  2001;  Laking,  2001; 
Yesilkagit,  2002;  Verhoest  et  all  2004)  until  profound  analysis  of  various  institutions  of  European 
countries. 
Firstly, the one supporting this doctrine were bent on the causes to see different variations of the 
autonomy existing between agencies and variations in different forms of individual agencies. So, there 
have been made different explications, from the interpretative explanations (Pollitt and Talbot, 2004) or 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Another type of exploratory research was conducted and channel on the effects of the autonomy 
regarding  the  performances  of  an  agency  studying  the  organizational  str ucture  as  a  condition  of 
performance  (van  Thiel,  2000;  Christensen  and  Laegreid,  2001;  Gains,  2001;  Pollitt,  Birchall  and 
Putnam, 1998). 
Although there is a growing abundance of European academic research in this area there is some 
sparkle in the current research in the theory, conceptual and methodological. These challenges are real 
and important as they demonstrate a quality of performance in research and even more a scientific 
quality in normative debates of practitioners. 
The tendency to migrate from a centralized administration to the creation of autonomous bodies has 
long been studied especially in the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Holland, Denmark) (Christensen 
and  Laegreid,  2007).  The  creation  of  specialized  institutions  can  lead  to  a  clear  demar cation  of 
responsibilities and roles, to greater efficiency but may also lead to increased complexity of coordination 
problems, reducing the potential for political control and accountability (Christensen and Laegreid, 2001, 
2006). Thus one of the key questions of the research concerns the need for a balance between 
institutional autonomy and the need for political control. 
Today public administration of the economically advanced countries provides a fragmented complex 
vision: the public sector is overwhelmed by a multitude of organizations with different forms, created by 
different legal instruments and with different financial and budgetary regimes.  The issue of political 
control became increasingly comprehensive compared to some decades ago. 
We are interested in answers to the following three sets of questions: What is the relationship between 
autonomy and the formal factor of the institutional system components? Which of the two forms of 
autonomy is much more numerous?  
A second set of questions are related to the modality through the participant actors in this social report 
may influence institutional autonomy: (2) what type of influence exists at the level of public sector and 
how large is this influence? 
A third set of questions concerns the relationship between the degree of influence perceived by them 
and the level of autonomy reported by the entities: (3) Are organizations with a bigger formal autonomy 
influenced less by policy makers? 
5. STUDY ON INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY IN HUNGARY 















































































































































































































































































administrative  elements  developed  due  to  a  common  history  comparable  to  those  in  Romania. 
Reflecting on the requirements imposed by the EU for accession and the OECD's recommendations for 
the development of administrative capacity in the public sector, the study will show the new challenges 
arising from institutional decentralization developing the principles of "good governance”, “efficiency and 
effectiveness", " coherence policy”. 
We can examine in the case of Hungary the way in which the European and international relations in 
general represent the “engine” for internal administrative reform. Therefore, the comparative study could 
share new information and experiences regarding the identification of measures that have to be taken in 
order to increase institutional decentralization degree and enhance the administrative autonomy, in the 
context of institutional development policies. 
The study will answer the question whether the structure of political transition from a centralized system 
to  an  economic  market  system  has  led  to  support  or  it  slowed  the  process  of  institutional 
decentralization.  Regarding  the  economic  autonomy  it  may  be  very  important  to  highlight  the 
opportunities and threats in this regard (Reflecting on the new regional policy objectives) (Szegvári, 
2003). 
5.1 Components and procedures for decentralization 
Typical trajectory of reform 
Public administration cannot be analyzed without taking into account the radical social, economical, 
political and legal transformations, in a given particular historical context. 
Decentralization is an essential part of the transformation of political systems. In the last period of 
transition the moving of the former "Soviet system" to a “system of self-government” in general interest, 
was  a  basic  element  in  the  democratization  process  and  implementation  of  political  pluralism  in 
Hungary. Most of the elements necessary to change have been realized later than 1980 (Horváth, 
2000). 
Regarding  the  systematic  transformation and  the  three  functions  of local  governments,  the  reform 
process of Hungarian decentralization continued until 1990 and took place in two main stages. In the 
first stage, the reform has focused primarily on the democratic and autonomous functions of the public 
administration. In the second stage of the process of decentralization, the main objective was to ensure 
the capacity of public administration, in the case where the "stabilization of public administration” is the 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































In the first stage of "transitional period" regulatory and institutional reforms were the basic elements of 
change.  Between  1989  and  1995,  Hungary  tried  to  implement  most  elements  of  the  legal  and 
institutional framework for a market economy and democratic governance. This transition period was 
also a stage of regulation and deregulation, but also a stage of technical transformation of the public 
administration. Since 1989, successive governments have eliminated normative acts that have changed 
the former centrally planned economy in accordance with the principle of decentralization. Meanwhile, 
The Parliament passed the primary legislation to create a constitutional and legal base in order to lead 
to an increase in democracy. Together, structural and governance reforms and stability of macro-
economic have generated significant economic and social benefits.   
The new legislation has been transformed through:  
1.  Constitutional amendments (changes to the previous key); 
2.  laws that regulate the self-governance (including the level of municipality and county) focusing 
on the new structure and operating rules; 
3.  laws regarding the local free elections, different from the definition of electoral system and 
process at multiple levels of local governments; 
4.  the laws that regulate the civil servants and contract employees in the public system; 
5.  organizational laws  and functioning of various institutions of public administration at every 
level; 
6.  governing the property laws; 
A new system of democracy has been established based on two pillars: the traditional Hungarian 
principles and European sector of the local self-governance of the Council of Europe (European Charter 
of local autonomy of the Council of Europe). 
Since 1990, the Hungarian government is placed between two institutional models: bureaucratic and 
democratic.  The  first  includes  central  government  bodies  and  bodies  of    and  regional  level  (de-
concentrated institutions) (Stewart  and Greenwood, 1995). The second type of structure is the system 
of administrative autonomy (institutional decentralization), based on the principles of subsidiary and 
autonomy. Public administration functions are shared by these two systems, creating competition for 
fulfilling the functions at the territorial level. This is the essence of conflict of interests between the 
autonomous local and regional structures of state administration bodies (Temesi, 2000). 















































































































































































































































































hierarchical relationship between the two types of local autonomy, according to the Constitution, the 
fundamental  rights  of  all  local  entities  being  equal.  The  difference  between  the  two  lies  in  the 
administrative tasks delegated to each. Municipalities have broad responsibilities in the provision of 
services. 
By the end of 1996, the process of institutional reform guaranteed the political, legal and economical 
autonomy  in  Hungary.  The  equilibrium  principle  has  played  an  important  role  in  preserving  the 
democratic policy and democratic institutional changes made by public institutions in the first stage of 
"transitional period". 
Therefore, since 1996, Hungary has passed at the next stage of public administration reform having to 
face with an overly rapid decentralization, without a solid institutional base. 
After ten years of determined reform, Hungary has joined the OECD as a special appreciation of the 
effort made in achieving the desiderata of economic growth and enhances the quality of governance 
(OECD, 2000). 
One of the first difficulties of the first stage of administrative reform based on the lack of experience was 
that there was no time in order to prepare the frame for the reform. 
No sufficient attention has been given to the efficiency and simplification and this led to delayed results. 
The controlling function has been virtually non-existent and had as consequences the rejection of the 
implementation of new regulations. 
In the second phase of public administrative reform new trends have been felt, avoiding institutional 
decentralization and the maintenance of an autonomous system. 
Lessons and recommendations 
Public  administration  reform  begins  in  post-Communist  Hungary  since  1990,  Hungarians  officials 
understanding the importance and the need for rapid implementation of a system administration based 
on  institutional  autonomy  in  order  to  meet  the  principles  set  by  the  European  institutions  in  the 
European Charter of Local Governance (Ghiolţan, 2005). 
The  process  of  Hungarian  public  administration  reform  was  conducted  in  two  major  phases, 
characterized by strong connection of continuity. The first stage was marked by the adoption, in 1990, of 
a number Normative Act LXV / 1990 on Local Public Administration, legislation, which along with the 
new  Constitution  recognized  the  right  of  self-governing  of  the  local  communities,  in  particular  the 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































Hungarian administrative system occurred through the adoption of Act No Normative. LXII / 1994 on 
Local Public Administration, legislation that led further the instituted reforms in  1990, correcting some 
errors of the previous of law and providing the legal force of new international principles, certain 
decisions of the Constitutional Court and other courts, some provisions of the specialty doctrine and not 
least of practical experiences encountered in the four years it has been in force the previous regulatory. 
Currently, the Hungarian public administration is carried out locally by two frames or structures of power 
that exercises both the specific tasks for each of them, but there are many cases of duplication of tasks. 
The  first  power  management  framework  includes  the  territorial  de -concentrate  institutes  of  public 
administration, namely agencies or services directly subordinated to the government at central level. 
The second power structure to which we refer is made up of local authorities that govern on the 
principles of decentralization and local autonomy. The two frameworks mentioned above have a range 
of  common  material  skills,  which  generates  both  conflict  and  overlap  of  functio ns,  but  mainly  a 
competition  between  decentralized  and  de-concentrated  institutes  for  the  achievements  of  public 
services,  competition  which  has  proved  to  be  particularly  beneficial  for  the  recipient  government 
services at the local level, without an existing subordination report between local and central public 
authorities.  
At the local level, governance is exercised through an elected council and a mayor, which is also 
directly elected. The two bodies mentioned above have a representative character they  can delegate 
some tasks to other elected or appointed bodies such as local decision-making committees, municipal 
councils, so-called neighborhood or city manager. 
A particularly interesting element of Hungarian local government is the existence of the institution's city 
manager, which may be typically a public official of high rank and who is engaged exclusively in the 
technical and professional administrative act, while the mayor has the factor of political representation. 
City manager is a named uninominal body and nit a chosen one, whose main role is to implement, in 
their everyday activity, strategies and general and directions established through the decisions of the 
mayor and local council proceeding from the authority to delegate tasks, coming from a chosen body, in 
this case the local mayor. The city manager has the obligation, established by law, to participate at the 
meetings of the local council, having the right, through the mayor to submit initiatives or projects that 
may be adopted by the council. 
The main advantage of the “city” manager institution, called on a indefinite period, respecting some 















































































































































































































































































to be done by a person in that domain, capable to effectively implement the local governance strategy of 
the mayor and local council. 
At the same time, city manager provides continuity of the act of the local public administration, because 
the mandate of such a public servant has a longer period than that of an elected mayor for 4 years.  
Another item that is noteworthy in the analysis of the Hungarian public administration, is the so-called 
"local governance at the districts level”, existing the possibility of the formation of neighborhood councils 
composed of members of the local council and voters, having as president one of the local municipality 
concerned. 
Local council of administrative and territorial unit, which includes the mentioned neighborhood, may 
delegate the neighborhood council adoption of decisions on specific areas of interest of the named 
quarter, providing the necessary financial resources for the implementation of delegated projects. 
The existence of this decision-making forum, at the neighborhood level, indicates the high level of the 
citizens the opportunity to participate effectively and directly in the political and administrative decisions, 
amongst other ways, most commonly used for the implementation of direct democracy at local level and 
the  local  referendum,  public  initiative  made  by  the  local  council  or  various  meetings,  with  formal 
character, organized between citizens and their elected representatives. 
Regarding the provision of public services of local interest, the local Hungarian authorities enjoy a large 
autonomy with regard to the formal organization of departments, to effectively projects of local interest 
and the financing of all aspects above mentioned. 
As  a  rule,  public  services  are  provided  either  directly  through  subordinate  institutions  of  the  local 
government, are either offered, towards achieving through contractual relationships of a legal person 
with a private capital, also existing the solution of public-private partnership.  
6. CONCLUSIONS  
Even if we do not talk about federative forms of organization, administrative autonomy is necessarily 
related  to  the  principle  of  subsidiary  under  which  the  state  should  intervene  only  in  exceptional 
situations. Local communities can solve the citizen’s problems more efficiently reaching their coverage 
area and therefore the solutions can be adapted more easily to the real needs of each person, having 
precedence as individuals and not as simple matters of law. It is therefore necessary for the state to 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































Mircea  Văraru  (1925)  appreciates  that  everything  can  decentralize,  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
executive, i.e. the right to command. 
The extent to which administrative individuals gain more legal and technical competence, the state is 
equally careful to centralize and to maintain intact the right to command, giving the exercise of this right 
only in certain well-ranked officials and allowing the use of public force only in cases and conditions 
which should ensure the whole time the monopoly of power in the hands of the state. Thus the public 
force,  instead  of  dividing  and  decentralizing,  is  more  and  more  centralized  in  the  hands  of  the 
government.  
Administrative decentralization takes place exclusively for the administrative units, for the endorsement 
of local and special interests in the most satisfactory conditions for the concerned population.  
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